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The article discusses the role of Rawls's theory of justice for the evaluation and improvement of social wellbeing. It is shown that 
the idea of justice can be seen as a specification of a more general moral idea of dignity. This approach allows us to characterize 
the actions of institutions and individuals not only in terms of their effectiveness, but also of their conformity with the dignity of 
the individual. Like any moral theory, Rawls's theory of justice is designed to assess various forms of social life and to determine 
the nature of the action towards them. The article claims that the introduction of the two principles of justice provides a higher 
degree of moral sensitivity to various forms of social life and a more differentiated moral attitude towards them. In conclusion, the 
paper examines the limits of applicability of Rawls's theory of justice. The article argues that the priority role of the idea of justice 
in the structure of moral theory comes from the specifics of the market society. 
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1. Introduction 
The effect produced by John Rawls's Theory of Justice is difficult to overestimate. The principles of justice, as 
well as the proposed methodology of their study (justice as fairness, the original position, a veil of ignorance, 
reflective equilibrium, the considered judgment), become part of the research tradition. In this article we would like 
to focus on the analysis of the role of this theory for the evaluation and improvement of the social wellbeing. The role 
implies both possible prospects of the theory of justice and its limits. 
 
2. The used research methods 
We used the following methods. The hermeneutical method allowed to reveal implicit contexts of functioning of 
Rawls's theory of justice. The critical method allowed to set limits of using of the theory of justice. The comparative 
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3. Results of research 
Rawls has been repeatedly and fairly criticized for a very shaky foundation of the selected principles. Derek Parfit 
notes that as soon as Rawls introduces the idea of own interests, his theory coincides with the concept of rational 
egoism (Parfit, 2011, 348). Leonard Choptiany points out that "one can neither draw blood from a stone nor extract 
moral principles from the decisions of rational egoists" (Choptiany, 1973, 150). We believe that these objections are 
not an insurmountable obstacle to the search for proper moral grounds of these principles. Following Kant, we 
interpret the basic moral principle as a requirement to treat any rational being (including oneself) as an end rather 
than a means. Further, according to Kant, we can specify this principle as a requirement to perform meritorious deeds 
or build a decent relationship, i.e. to take actions and attitudes to express, preserve, and create the self-worth of any 
party. Accordingly, the preservation or maintenance of dignity will be the criterion for evaluating their morality. 
Then the requirement of equal rights for each person (or the first principle of justice, according to Rawls) can 
easily be interpreted as an expression of dignity and a condition for it. In particular, Rawls's thesis about the equal 
distribution of liberty and opportunity (Rawls, (1971) 1999, 54) can be interpreted as a demand for conditions that 
each person could reach certain social benefits through their own efforts. It is a condition and a way to demonstrate 
(and achieve) the private autonomy, and hence its value in itself. The difference principle can be interpreted as a 
requirement to create equal starting positions, or, according to Rawls, as the "principle of fair equality of opportunity" 
(Rawls, (1971) 1999, 63). It implies actions to redistribute wealth, or the realization of the principle of redress 
(Rawls, (1971) 1999, 86). This can be considered an expression and a way to form respect for each person in 
conditions of inequality of natural talents and abilities, as well as in real social contexts (inequalities of birth, for 
instance). Finally, the difference principle as the principle of redress can be understood as a condition and a way of 
expressing decent attitude to those who cannot attain wealth through their own efforts for reasons beyond control. In 
other words, "in fully just or well-ordered society citizens seek not only to act in accordance with these principles, but 
also from these principles" (Baynes, 2006, 185). 
The principles of justice proposed by Rawls suggest their acquiring value only within the framework of a more 
general (or wider) context (Rawls, (1971) 1999, 8-9). Rawls connects it with the notion of rational men (Rawls, 
(1971) 1999, 11). As part of the search for moral grounds these principles can be associated with the idea of their 
dignity. Then the idea of justice can be seen as the specification of a more general idea of dignity associated with the 
"distributive aspects of the basic structure of society" (Rawls, (1971) 1999, 8). So, we can assess the unfair retirement 
benefit rate, but it makes no sense to assess similarly the failure to assist an elderly person when crossing a street. 
However, both situations can be equally characterized as humiliation or disrespect for the person. 
Regarding the theory of justice, this approach leads to its complexity, as it involves not only rational calculation, 
but also the feeling of self-respect. We leave aside the conditions and methods of formation of moral motives, 
although Rawls pays sufficient attention to this issue and notes, in particular, that "the moral feelings are a normal 
feature of human life" (Rawls, (1971), 1999, 427). On the other hand, this approach offers a more diverse and flexible 
strategy of moral reasoning. So, the answer to the question why this or that social institution is unjust could be found 
in the thesis that this institution in its present form is an affront to human dignity. 
If we move in the opposite direction, we could and should consider Rawls's theory of justice as a further 
productive specification and differentiation of the general, and therefore abstract, moral positions. For Rawls, "the 
primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social 
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties" (Rawls, (1971) 1999, 6). However, it does not cancel, and even 
suggests, the moral behavior of individuals. Moreover, the actions of a person of moral worth (Rawls, (1971) 1999, 
383), as well as expanding the range of such people, are a prerequisite for the implementation of the principles of 
justice. As noted by Michael G. Titelbaum, "We [...] have two types of arguments for adding an ethos to Rawls's 
description of the just society: first, that the citizens of the just society could not support that society consistently over 
time unless they displayed an individual ethos; and second, that absent such an ethos the just society would not 
exhibit the mutual respect and fraternity that Rawls takes to be among its important attractions" (Titelbaum, 2008, 
301). It can be added that only human behavior can be described as worthy or unworthy. Institutions can be 
interpreted only as the conditions and methods of providing or not providing dignity. 
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Then, the principles of the theory of justice can be viewed as specific moral provisions that individuals can follow 
in their activities. So, the equality of rights can be interpreted as providing opportunities to achieve benefits using 
one's own resources, and thus, as a way to achieve self-esteem. Then, the difference principle can be interpreted as an 
indication of actions an individual should perform in relation to others to promote equal starting points. This type of 
actions can be considered a way of expressing respect for others. Finally, the difference principle can be an indication 
of how to show respect to those who are not objectively able to achieve wealth through their own efforts. 
It is obvious that any moral theory performs at least two functions. Firstly, it acts as the basis for assessments of 
various forms of social life. Secondly, it indicates the direction to transform these forms. The collection of such 
assessments and actions actually becomes what is called "moral attitude". This approach is fully applicable to Rawls's 
theory, as he distinguishes moral evaluation of social life and its evaluation from the standpoint of efficiency (Rawls, 
(1971), 1999, 57-65). The social value of any moral theory implies expanding the range of estimates of social reality. 
In other words, we can evaluate social life not only from the standpoint of its efficiency, but also in terms of its moral 
permissibility. Then the methodological task of the moral theory is to provide the individual with tools for both 
interpretation and transformation of social life. It should be noted here that the metaphor of the tool does not mean 
interpreting morality only as a means to achieve certain extramoral goals. The role of a moral theory in the 
reconstruction of the social world is not only to answer the question of how and what should be changed in the social 
world, but also why it should be done. Then the choice of a moral theory depends on the effectiveness of its tools. 
Firstly, it is the degree of specificity of moral interpretations of various social phenomena, and, secondly, the extent 
of moral sensitivity to a variety of such phenomena. 
Regarding the first, we have already stressed the role of the theory of justice for the implementation of more 
flexible strategies of moral relations to different social phenomena. In other words, this is the answer to how to assess 
them, and how to act in relation to them. The value of Rawls's theory is that it contributes to the enrichment of our 
moral repertoire or provides more flexible methods and forms of moral attitudes. This means, first of all, that our 
intuitions about moral significance of a certain segment of social life take on a specific design. We are able to 
determine the actual forms of life as compliant or incompliant with the requirements of justice. 
Moreover, Rawls's antiutilitarian thesis that "there is no reason to suppose that the principles which should 
regulate an association of men is simply an extension of the principle of choice for one man" (Rawls, (1971) 1999, 
25) is the methodological guidance to even a greater specificity of moral attitude, namely the essence of justice. It is 
obvious that the reduction of justice only to the principles of natural liberty and liberal equality would put the 
distribution of goods or careers open to talents depending on social contingencies. It is equally clear that the 
requirement for the aligned starting places is hardly applicable to those who cannot realize the conception of careers 
open to talents for reasons beyond control. Therefore, what appears an expression of respect for one could be an 
affront to the of others. Thus, the introduction of the two principles is intended to overcome the limitation and 
simplification of possible moral interpretations or excessive moral rigorism. Moreover, the introduction and 
appropriate interpretation of the difference principle is not just designed to provide a variety of forms of expression of 
social justice, but also to organize them by making dependent on the types of individuals and their situations.  
It should be noted that the proposed principles overcome possible simplifying not only through various forms of 
expression of justice, but also through moral justification of various forms of social life. In particular, we speak about 
social and economic inequalities, namely about the conditions of their moral permissibility. Here it is possible to 
debate whether the difference principle rules out the presence in the just society of any inequalities that do not 
redound to the benefit of the worst-off (Titelbaum, 2008, 291-293). In any case, the wording of the difference 
principle does not prohibit social inequalities as such. They are even contained in the first principle: "Rawls's position 
is generally understood to imply that [...] then justice not only condones, but also requires these inequalities" 
(Baynes, 2006, 183). According to Russell Hardin, "thorough going equality seems hopeless because it would come 
at such a high cost in other concerns, such as, especially, productivity and the continued innovation that might 
eventually make poverty no longer a scourge of humanity" (Hardin, 1999, 412). 
The thesis of moral sensitivity implies an answer to the question of what is subject to moral evaluation and what 
can and should be subject to moral action. This means that the character of the moral theory determines the segments 
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of social life that fall into its field of view. So, the moral teachings can reduce any problems only to personal vices 
and virtues, tacitly admitting the original rationality of certain social institutions. From this historical perspective 
Rawls's theory undoubtedly extends the objects of moral judgments and actions, and specifies the moral vocabulary 
to be used to judge them. 
Traditionally, moral attitude has been reduced to discrete actions of certain individuals in the field of interpersonal 
relations. In this context the theory of justice favors a broader panorama of the human being's moral vision. First of 
all, we mean social, economic and political phenomena (labor relations, distribution of power, status and role system, 
organization of urban and office space, etc.), often slipping out of the moral theory purview. Therefore, the role of the 
theory of justice is to establish connection of these phenomena with morality and provide specific and adequate moral 
vocabulary to define the nature of this connection. Thus, the relationship of employee and employer can hardly be 
described in terms of brotherhood, friendship and solidarity, yet their characteristics in terms of justice would be 
acceptable and even necessary. 
Attention to the social and economic phenomena is significant as it directs the moral discourse to the sphere of 
human life that can be described in terms of consistency, continuity, and long-term prospects. In other words, we 
speak about relationships. It can be easily seen that the configuration of relationships can program interpersonal or 
group conflicts. Thus, the theory of justice can be considered as a methodology designed to direct our attention to 
different configurations of social life at macro- and micro levels, and, above all, to structure and differentiate our 
moral vision of these configurations. Thus, the reduction of equity only to the first principle would leave unattended a 
very vast area of social relations associated, in particular, with what Rawls calls "the influence of social contingencies 
and natural fortune on distributive shares" (Rawls, (1971) 1999, 63). 
Finally, it can be noted that the degree of specification and differentiation of moral provisions in Rawls's theory 
contributes to moral sensitivity to the growing variety of social events. So, we can project the principles of justice 
onto the general structure of social life, and we can apply them to the analysis of the relations in a particular firm, 
office, workplace, etc. Finally, it allows translating our vague moral intuitions to the formalized and structured 
discourse. 
This role of the theory of justice allows understanding its perspectives and limits. The epistemic value of any 
theory is that it proposes or determines the field of themes and issues falling within the scope of the research. In this 
sense, even the active rejection of the provisions, Rawls's ideas in particular, is indicative of their effect.  
In this context we should focus on possible limits of Rawls's theory. The book of this American thinker begins 
with the thesis that "justice is the first virtue of social institutions" (Rawls, (1971) 1999, 3). In this work Rawls does 
not discuss this idea in detail. He only asserts that the "laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-
arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust" (Rawls, (1971) 1999, 3), and that the judgments of this 
kind "seem to express our intuitive conviction of the primacy of justice" (Rawls, (1971) 1999, 4). 
Then the question why justice suggests that its object can be described and evaluated, firstly, in the framework of 
another concept of justice, and, secondly, in terms of friendship, fraternity, cooperation and solidarity. Rawls notes 
that "the ideal of fraternity is sometimes thought to involve ties of sentiment and feeling which it is unrealistic to 
expect between members of the wider society" (Rawls, (1971) 1999, 90), and believes that " the merit of the 
difference principle is that it provides an interpretation of the principle of fraternity" (Rawls, (1971) 1999, 90). 
We assert that the fraternity is not so much the idea of "not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the 
benefit of others who are less well off" (Rawls, (1971) 1999, 90), but in irrelevance and even unacceptability of such 
concepts to describe the essence of fraternity. We believe that Rawls's reasoning of fraternity retains the residue of 
ideas about society as a collection of autonomous individuals driven by the same objectives (the ideology of success), 
but recognizing only fair competition, sincerely wishing the same success for each, for which they undertake 
appropriate actions in relation to others. It seems that fraternity implies a union built on the common (collective), 
rather than similar goals. Moreover, the goal should be such as to give rise to a relationship where individuals do not 
only consider the feelings of others, but also need each other. The essence of this is in the specific requirements to be 
together, which is usually described in terms of love and friendship, rather than in the benefits of cooperation to 
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survive or achieve greater well-being. Therefore, Rawls's theory, and the difference principle in particular, should be 
interpreted only as a step towards fraternity, rather than the model to interpret and specify the essence of fraternity. 
The assertion that social relations can be described by other moral vocabulary than the discourse of justice means 
that this description should not be considered alternative rather than complementary. This thesis reinforces the 
question why justice. Here, of course, we can recall David Hume's argument about some properties of the human 
spirit coinciding with the character of actual and potential benefits to become crucial conditions for choosing the idea 
of justice. Let us place this idea into a certain social, cultural, and historical context. Then, we dare claim that justice 
is the only possible, acceptable, universal and feasible type of moral relations for particular socio-economic relations 
and individuals generated by them.  
Thus, we assume that the theory of justice, in Rawls's version, is the only conceivable kind of compromise 
between the demands of the market economy and the whole society built on the principle of competition, on the one 
hand, and the principles of morality, based on the priority of values of respect for each personality. The dramatic 
nature of the situation is that the market society is a prerequisite to ensure respect for the various types of 
personalities through the distribution of rights and redistribution of benefits. On the other hand, market relations 
impose insurmountable restrictions on moral relations. It is impossible to demand that the employer and employee or 
entrepreneurs build friendship, cooperation and fraternity, as the forms of their being are constituted by the relations 
of exchange or competition. 
As a consequence, there is a moral gap between different spheres of human existence. It is explained by the fact 
that they are governed by different moral principles that do not communicate with each other. There is no opportunity 
for these principles to smoothly run into one another. So, the sphere of labor, social relations and politics is governed 
by relations of justice. Private life allows and even demands friendship, love, and fraternity up to altruism. It makes 
us distinguish the morality regulating relations between individuals as bearers of certain social roles, and the morality 
governing their relations as just human beings. The only thing that unites them in moral terms is the idea of respect or 
dignity. The condition of their communication is a very fragile bridge of the difference principle. Rawls is very chary 
discussing the so-called natural duties (Rawls, (1971) 1999, 98-101). It seems that the thing is not even in the 
difference between the duties and obligations generated by the presence or absence of institutional relationships. The 
types of links between natural duties and requirements of justice in Rawls's version are very limited. The first do not 
come out of the second and vice versa. 
 
4. Conclusion 
As it was rightly pointed out by Titelbaum, the task of moral teachings is "to promote something, not to prevent 
something" (Titelbaum, 2008, 309). However, due to a certain conflict between the requirements of morality and 
market relations, the first are forced to appear as prohibitions and restrictions (in corresponding wordings) rather than 
positive indications. Finally, Rawls intentionally distinguishes duties and permissions (Rawls, (1971), 1999, 100). 
The former refer to what is required, the latter – only to what is just desired. The reason seems to be not that they are 
a class of supererogatory actions (acts of benevolence and mercy, of heroism and self-sacrifice). The price for the 
latter may be excessive (Rawls, (1971), 1999, 100)). In a market society only the ideas of justice become a demand. 
The rest remains in the sphere of the desired or required only in local segments of private life. In other words, in a 
market society we have the right to demand justice, while love and friendship can only be wished for. 
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